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Note
Don't Tip the Scales! The Actual Malice Standard
Unjustifiably Eliminates First Amendment Protection
for Public Employees' Recklessly False Statements
Leslie S. Blickenstaffl
Susan Carter worked as a teacher in a public high school for
five years.' Although she received some negative performance
reviews, she had few conflicts during her tenure. Ms. Carter
became suspicious, however, that school board members were
using excess funds to finance their personal needs instead of to
increase faculty salaries or to pay school debts. Ms. Carter
researched school files and found no evidence to support her
suspicions. She nonetheless confronted her supervisor, Mary
Larkin, and accused the school board of embezzling money,
cheating faculty out of compensation and lying to the school
district and the public regarding the allocation of funds. Although
the unsupported accusations caused few problems for the school
district, Larkin fired Ms. Carter for her statements. Ms. Carter
subsequently filed suit claiming her dismissal violated her First
Amendment right to freedom of speech.' At trial, the school board
proved Ms. Carter's statements were recklessly false.
* J.D. Candidate 1997, University of Minnesota Law School; B-A. 1994,
Bowdoin College.
1. The author derived these hypothetical facts from actual situations
presented to the Supreme Court. See generally Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct.
1878 (1994) (plurality opinion) (upholding a hospital's dismissal of a nurse who
criticized her supervisor); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 381 (1987)
(holding the First Amendment protected a constable's derogatory statement
about the President); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (holding the First
Amendment protected an employee's questionnaire on workplace atmosphere);
Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979) (deciding the
First Amendment protected an employee's privately expressed criticisms of a
supervisor); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (holding the First
Amendment protected a teacher's speech criticizing the school board).
2. "[A] State cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes
the employee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression."
Connick, 461 U.S. at 142 (citations omitted).
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The issue before the court in the preceding hypothetical case
was whether a public employee's recklessly false statements that
cannot reasonably be presumed or shown to have had any harmful
effects are unprotected by the First Amendment.3 The federal
circuits currently are split over the question: some find no
protection,4 some find no per se nonprotection, and some do not
reach a clear conclusion.6 A clarification of the standard the
3. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574 n.6 (refusing to address this issue
explicitly).
4. The Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits hold a public employee's
recklessly false statements are unprotected. See, e.g., Williams v. Common-
wealth, 24 F.3d 1526, 1535 (6th Cir.) (stating a public employer is entitled to
qualified immunity if he reasonably believed the "employee made statements
with knowledge of, or reckless indifference to, their falsity" since such
statements do not enjoy First Amendment protection), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
358 (1994); Brenner v. Brown, 36 F.3d 18, 20 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding an
employee's recklessly false statements did not constitute protected speech);
McGee v. South Pemiscot Sch. Dist. R-V, 712 F.2d 339, 342 (8th Cir. 1983)
(stating that Pickering established a school board may not dismiss an employee
for criticizing school policies unless the employee's speech contains knowingly
or recklessly false statements).
5. The First, Fourth, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits hold a
public employee's recklessly false statements are not per se unprotected.
Instead, these circuits consider the recklessness of the statement as a factor in
the Pickering test. See, e.g., Brasslett v. Cota, 761 F.2d 827, 840-41 (1st Cir.
1985) (stating Pickering expressly declined to adopt a rule that "knowingly or
recklessly false statements are per se unprotected," and concluding courts
should weigh maliciousness in the balancing of interests); Buschi v. Kirven, 775
F.2d 1240, 1248 (4th Cir. 1985) (recognizing Pickering did not decide whether
recklessly false statements were unprotected); Johnson v. Multnomah County,
48 F.3d 420, 423-24 (9th Cir.) (concluding recklessly false statements are not
per se unprotected when they substantially relate to matters of public concern,
but the recklessness should be considered as part of the Pickering balancing
test), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2616 (1995); American Postal Workers Union v.
United States Postal Serv., 830 F.2d 294, 308 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (recognizing
Pickering demonstrates false statements may qualify as speech on a matter of
public concern and may ultimately receive First Amendment protection).
6. The Fifth and Tenth Circuits have not reached a clear conclusion. See,
e.g., Moore v. City of Kilgore, 877 F.2d 364,376 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (applying
the New York Times standard and concluding that because the employer made
no showing that the employee's statements were knowingly or recklessly false,
the court would not consider the employer's interest in controlling an accurate
flow of information to the public in the Pickering balance), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1003 (1989); D'Andrea v. Adams, 626 F.2d 469, 473-76 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating
that the Constitution does not protect knowing or reckless falsehood, but
considering recklessness as a factor in a balancing test), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
919 (1981); Moore v. City of Wynnewood, 57 F.3d 924, 933 (10th Cir. 1995)
(assuming deliberately or recklessly false statements are either unprotected or
that "intentional falsity would weigh heavily against protection"); Johnsen v.
Independent Sch. Dist., 891 F.2d 1485, 1493 (10th Cir. 1989) (an employee's
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courts should use in these public employee free speech cases is
thus in order.
This Note analyzes the division over whether the recklessly
false statements of a public employee are unprotected by the First
Amendment. Part I details the development of public employees'
free speech rights, provides a summary of defamation jurispru-
dence and the actual malice standard,7 and discusses the circuit
courts' approaches. Part II examines the problems with applying
the actual malice standard to a public employee's recklessly false
statements, contending that the standard ignores fundamental
differences between the public employment and defamation
contexts and thus it should not apply to a public employee's
speech. Instead, courts should apply a standard founded on a case-
by-case balancing of the interests involved. Part III concludes
courts should consider the recklessness of the speech as a factor in
the balancing test set forth by the Supreme Court in Pickering v.
Board of Education.'
I. FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE:
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FREE SPEECH RIGHTS AND
DEFAMATION LAW
The Supreme Court historically refused to recognize a public
employee's right to object to conditions of employment.9 In the
1950s and 1960s, however, the Court began to grant public
employees some First Amendment protection. ° The Court
false statements weighed against protection of his interests); Wulf v. City of
Wichita, 883 F.2d 842, 858 (10th Cir. 1989) ("the Supreme Court has left open
the possibility that [a knowingly or recklessly false statement]... might merit
First Amendment protection where no harmful effects can be shown").
7. "Actual malice under the New York Times standard should not be
confused with the [common law] concept of malice as an evil intent or as a
motive arising from spite or ill will." Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 111 S.
Ct. 2419, 2429 (1991). The actual malice standard requires a public official to
prove the defendant made the defamatory remark "With knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard for whether it was false or not." New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
8. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
9. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983) (for "most of this
century, the unchallenged dogma was that a public employee had no right to
object to conditions placed upon the terms of employment-including those
which restricted the exercise of constitutional rights").
10. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967) (teachers'
refusal to sign a certificate verifying they were not communists did not provide
basis for dismissal); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 190-92 (1952)
(teachers' refusal to take a loyalty oath did not provide basis for dismissal).
1996]
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recognized that the First Amendment prohibited states from
requiring their employees to take loyalty oaths." Additionally,
the Court rejected the premise "that public employment.., maybe
conditioned upon the surrender of constitutional rights which
could not be abridged by direct government action." 2 In so
holding, the Court paved the way for an expansion of public
employees' First Amendment rights.
A. PICKERING V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: THE COURT
ESTABLISHES THE BALANCING TEST
The expansion of public employees' First Amendment rights
occurred in the landmark decision of Pickering v. Board of
Education." Mr. Pickering, a public high school teacher, sent a
letter to a local newspaper criticizing the Board of Education's
handling of a bond issue proposal and its subsequent allocation of
funds between the school's educational and athletic programs. 4
The Board believed many of Mr. Pickering's statements were false
and claimed his letter undermined the Board's integrity and
disrupted faculty discipline, thus justifying his dismissal. 5 Mr.
Pickering subsequently filed suit, claiming the dismissal violated
his First Amendment right to free speech.'6 Mr. Pickering
argued for the application of the actual malice standard, which
requires a defamation plaintiff to prove the defendant made
statements with knowledge of falsity or with reckless disregard for
11. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 604; Wieman, 344 U.S. at 190-92.
12. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 605. Faculty members of a state university
refused to sign a certificate that they were not communists. Id. at 592. The
university told them that their failure to sign the certificate required their
dismissal. Id. The faculty members filed suit claiming that the state program
violated the Constitution. Id. The Court concluded that, "'even though the
governmental purpose [of protecting its educational system can] be legitimate
and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.'"
Id. at 602 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)).
13. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
14. Id. at 566. The Court concluded most of Mr. Pickering's remarks
consisted of opinion or were accurate. The remarks found to be false were
"perfectly consistent with good faith error." Id. at 582.
15. Id. at 566-67. The Board stated Mr. Pickering's letter "unjustifiably
impugned the 'motives, honesty, integrity, truthfulness, responsibility and
competence' of both the Board and the school administration." The Board
further claimed his letter fostered conflict and tension among teachers,
administrators, the Board, and district residents. Id.
16. Id. at 565.
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the truth. 7 The Board of Education argued the State could set
standards for a public employee's speech.'"
The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the State
could condition public employment on waiving rights, 9 yet
recognized the State's interests as an employer in regulating the
speech of its employees. 20  The Court declined, however, to
establish any specific test to determine when a public employer
could discipline a public employee based on the employee's
speech.2' Indeed, it refused to apply an actual malice stan-
dard.22 Instead, it introduced a balancing test: "The problem in
any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the
teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
17. Id. at 569; see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-
80 (1964) (establishing actual malice standard).
18. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 568-69. "Because of the enormous variety of fact situations in
which critical statements by teachers and other public employees may be
thought by their superiors, against whom the statements are directed, to
furnish grounds for dismissal," the Court concluded it was not "appropriate or
feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all such
statements maybe judged." Id.
Some commentators argue Pickering applied the New York Times standard.
See, e.g., Richard E. Johnson, No More Teachers'Dirty Looks-Now They Sue:
An Analysis of Plaintiff Status Determinations in Defamation Actions by Public
Educators, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 761, 768 n.52, 795 (1990) (stating that
Pickering adopted New York Times standard). In fact. Justice White claimed
the core of the Pickering holding was that the New York Times standard should
be the test for Mr. Pickering's discharge. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 583 (White, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). But see infra note 22 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the Court's refusal to apply the actual malice standard).
22. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574. The Court stated, "[wle have already noted
our disinclination to make an across-the-board equation of dismissal from public
employment for remarks critical of superiors with awarding damages in a libel
suit by a public official for similar criticism." Id. at 574; see also Barnes v.
Small, 840 F.2d 972, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (stating "the Supreme Court has
consistently noted that dismissal from employment and libel actions trigger
different sorts of First Amendment analysis" and citing Pickering as exemplify-
ing the Court's refusal to equate libel and dismissal of public employment suits);
W. Eric Dennison, Note, Constitutional Law-First Amendment Right to
Freedom of Speech-Infringement Upon Public Employees' Right to Speak on
Matters of Public Concern, 55 TENN. L. REv. 175, 184 n.93 (1987) (stating the
Court refused to apply the New York Times standard although Mr. Pickering




Applying this balancing test, the Court considered Mr.
Pickering's interest in free expression and society's interest in
having unrestricted debate on matters of public importance.24
The Court balanced these interests against the school's interests
in maintaining workplace discipline, harmony, loyalty, confidence,
and efficiency." The Court found Mr. Pickering's statements did
not threaten discipline or workplace harmony because Mr.
Pickering did not direct his statements at someone with whom he
worked daily.26 Additionally, Mr. Pickering's statements did not
undermine any close working relationships that required loyalty
and confidence. The Court also concluded the alleged falsity of
the statements caused no harm because there was little public
reaction to the letter. 8 Concluding that Mr. Pickering's interests
outweighed the school's, the Court held that "absent proof of false
statements knowingly or recklessly made by him," a teacher
cannot be dismissed from public employment because he spoke
about issues of public concern. 9 In footnote six, the Court noted
an unresolved issue:
Because we conclude that appellant's statements were not knowingly or
recklessly false, we have no occasionto pass uponthe additional question
whether a statement that was knowingly or recklessly false would, if it
were neither shown nor could reasonably be presumed to have had any
harmful effects, still be protected by the First Amendment.'0
23. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
24. Id. at 568-73.
25. Id. at 570.
26. Id. The Court recognized, however, that there would be "some positions
in public employment in which the need for confidentiality is so great that even
completely correct public statements might furnish a permissible ground for
dismissal." Id. at 570 n.3.
27. Id. The Court also stated that there are some positions in which the
relationship between an employee and their superior is so personal and
intimate that certain forms of public criticism would seriously undermine the
effectiveness of the working relationship. Id. at 570 n.3.
28. Id. at 570-71.
29. Id. Many courts have construed this holding to mean that the First
Amendment does not protect a statement that is knowingly or recklessly false.
See supra note 4 (citing cases holding a public employee's recklessly, false
statements are unprotected); see also Dennis H. Millbrath, The Free Speech
Rights of Public Employees: Balancing With the Home Field Advantage, 20
IDAHO L. REV. 703, 720 (1984) (stating many courts changed the scope of
Pickering by holding that unprotected speech need not be balanced).
30. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574 n.6. The Court also emphasized that
Pickering did not involve the question of whether a teacher's statements were
so groundless as to call into question his ability to perform his duties. Id. at
572 n.5. "In such a case, of course, the statements would merely be evidence
916 [Vol. 80:911
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B. MODIFICATION OF THE BALANCING TEST: PICKERING'S
PROGENY
Although the Pickering balancing test increased the rights of
public employees, the malleable nature of the test made its
manipulation inevitable. The Supreme Court subsequently added
to3 and modified 2 the Pickering test, and public employee First
Amendment jurisprudence developed on a case-by-case basis.3
Despite these developments, however, the Court has never
answered the question left open in Pickering of how to treat
knowingly or recklessly false statements that have no harmful
effects.
The first addition to the Pickering balancing test occurred in
Mt. Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle.34 In Mt. Healthy, a
school board declined to rehire an untenured teacher shortly after
the teacher disclosed to a local radio station the contents of a
of the teacher's general competence, or lack thereof, and not an independent
basis for dismissal." Id.
In his partial concurrence, however, Justice White vehemently disagreed.
He argued deliberate or reckless falsehoods serve no First Amendment purpose
and, therefore, deserve no protection. Id. at 583 (White, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Justice White suggested the Court already "unequivo-
cally recognized ... that the knowingly false statement and the false statement
made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional
protection.'" Id. (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964)).
Indeed, he claimed, "[i]f Pickering's false statements were either knowingly or
recklessly made, injury to the school system becomes irrelevant, and the First
Amendment would not prevent his discharge." Id. at 584.
31. See Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-16
(1979) (granting protection to speech that is expressed publicly or privately); Mt.
Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (promulgating a
causation test to apply with the Pickering balancing test).
32. See infra notes 44-54 and accompanying text (describing the "public
concern threshold").
33. See generally, Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287 (establishing a causation
test where a public employer must show that it would have reached the same
decision as to an employee's termination even in the absence of protected
conduct); Givhan, 439 U.S. at 415-16 (granting protection to speech expressed
both publicly and privately); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983)
(implying that speech must address a matter of public concern to be protected);
Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384-85 (1987) (explicitly establishing a
public concern threshold); Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1888-89 (1994)
(plurality opinion) (requiring a public employer to make a reasonable
investigation of what an employee actually said before making any employment
decision).
34. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
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memorandum concerning the school's new dress code. 5  The
teacher filed suit, claiming the Board violated his First Amend-
ment rights. 6 In resolving the teacher's claim, the Court estab-
lished a new causation test requiring the public employee to prove
that the First Amendment protected his speech and that the
speech was a motivating factor in the Board's decision not to rehire
him. 7 If the public employee meets this burden, the Court held
that the employer must then show by a preponderance of the
evidence that it would have dismissed the employee regardless of
his constitutionally protected conduct.35
The Supreme Court further refined the Pickering balancing
test in Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District.
39
Givhan held the First Amendment protects both public and private
expression of public employees.4 ° The Court explained that when
a government employee speaks publicly, the reviewing court must
35. Id. at 282.
36. Id. at 276. The district court held the teacher's call to the radio station
was "clearly protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 283. Because the call
constituted protected speech and because it played a substantial part in the
decision of the school board not to renew the teacher's employment, the district
court held the teacher was entitled to reinstatement with backpay. The
Supreme Court, however, feared the district court's causation rule would allow
an employee to immunize herself or himself against adverse employment
actions by engaging in constitutionally protected conduct even though she or he
deserves dismissal. Id. at 286.
37. Id. at 287.
38. Id. The Court remanded the case for appropriate application of the new
causation test. Id. Commentators criticized the Mt. Healthy decision. See, e.g.,
Richard H. Hiers,Academic Freedom in Public Colleges and Universities: 0 Say,
Does That Star-Spangled First Amendment Banner Yet Wave?, 40 WAYNE L.
REV. 1, 32-33 (1993) (arguing public employees' First Amendment rights are
violated with impunity because employers can base adverse personnel actions
on employees' faults or deficiencies found through investigation of personnel
records); Millbrath, supra note 29, at 711 ("Mt. Healthy effectively eliminated
the public employer's perceived jeopardy when action is taken against the 'bold
employee' and shifted the advantage back to the employer.").
39. 439 U.S. 410 (1979). In Givhan, the school district refused to renew a
teacher's contract, alleging the teacher gave lower grades to white students',
attempted to disrupt a meeting on desegregation, threatened not to return to
work after the school's desegregation, and protected a student during a weapons
search. Id. at 413 n.3. The teacher argued the school's action violated her First
Amendment rights. Id. at 412. The district court concluded the teacher's
criticism of school district policy served as the primary reason for the non-
renewal of the contract and therefore ordered the teacher reinstated. Id. at 413.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, reversed, concluding that the
private expression of speech does not warrant First Amendment protection. Id.
at 413.
40. Id. at 415-16.
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address the content of the employee's statements to determine the
effect on the employee's performance or the agency's operation.41
Privately expressed speech, however, may "bring additional factors
to the Pickering calculus."42 When an employee confronts a
superior privately, the Court suggested that "the employing
agency's institutional efficiency maybe threatened not only by the
content of the employee's message but also by the manner, time,
and place in which it is delivered."43 For example, if a male
employee continuously requests private meetings with his female
supervisor in which he is physically threatening and demands that
she admit to some perceived wrongdoing, the supervisor may not
only lose authority over and respect from the employee involved,
but may also feel so personally threatened as to affect her perfor-
mance within the entire agency. The agency itself will suffer by
the deterioration of the employee-employer relationship as well as
the supervisor's decreased efficiency.
The third modification of the Pickering test occurred in
Connick v. Myers." Connick implicitly established a "public
concern threshold" that must be met if a public employee's speech
is to receive constitutional protection.45 The Court stated that if
41. Id. at 415 n.4.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). Ms. Myers was an Assistant District Attorney for
five and a half years when her supervisor told her that she would be transferred
to a different section of the criminal court. Id. at 140. Although, Ms. Myers
opposed the transfer and expressed her concern to several of her supervisors,
the transfer occurred anyway. Id. at 140-41. Ms. Myers subsequently prepared
and distributed a questionnaire to fellow staff members concerning the office's
transfer policy, morale, the need for a grievance committee, the level of
confidence in supervisors, and whether employees felt pressure to work in
political campaigns. Id. at 141. The District Attorney fired Ms. Myers because
of her refusal to accept the transfer and because he considered the distribution
of the questionnaire as "an act of insubordination." Id. Ms. Myers filed suit,
claiming the District Attorney violated her First Amendment rights. Id.
The district court held the questionnaire constituted protected speech and
the Pickering balance weighed in the employee's favor. Id. at 142. The court
concluded the District Attorney could not prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that Ms. Myers would have been terminated regardless of the
questionnaire and ordered her reinstated. Id. at 141-42. The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's opinion. Id. at 142. The Supreme
Court ultimately held the interests of the employee in commenting upon
matters of public concern outweighed the interests of the employer in promoting
efficiency of public services. Id. at 138.
45. Id. at 146. Prior to Connick, the Supreme Court only hinted that a
public employee's speech must address matters of public concern to receive First
Amendment protection. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574
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an employee's speech does not qualify as speech on a matter of
public concern, it is unnecessary to examine the reasons for the
employee's discharge.46 If the speech addresses a matter of public
concern, however, the Court then determines the degree to which
the statement is protected by the First Amendment by considering
the extent to which the speech addresses the issue of public
concern.47 In Connick, the Court concluded that the question-
naire distributed by the employee touched upon matters of public
concern only in a "most limited sense."" The employee therefore
enjoyed a limited First Amendment interest that did not require
the employer to tolerate action that it"reasonablybelieved" would
disrupt office efficiency or working relationships." The Court
rejected the employee's argument that an agency must clearly
demonstrate that an employee's activities substantially interfered
with office operations to justify a discharge." Such a standard,
the Court explained, ignored the conclusion in Pickering that the
(1968) (holding a "teacher's exercise of his right to speak on issues of public
importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employ-
ment").
46. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146. The Court explained that "when employee
expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political,
social, or other concern to the community, government officials should enjoy
wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the
judiciary in the name of the First Amendment." Id. The Court qualified its
statement by refusing to conclude that speech not on a matter of public concern
was totally beyond the First Amendment. Id. at 147. Examples of statements
held to qualify as speech on a matter of public concern include a deputy's
statement to a co-worker that she hoped a presidential assassination attempt
was successful, Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 386 (1987), an employee's
statement regarding political patronage practices and corruption in an
employment services office, Williams v. Commonwealth, 24 F.3d 1526, 1534 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 358 (1994), and a fire chiefs statement in a
television interview that the local station had only two working fire trucks,
Brasslett v. Cota, 761 F.2d 827, 830 (1st Cir. 1985).
47. Connick, 461 U.S. at 152. Many commentators have criticized the
public concern test. See, e.g., Stephen Alred, Note, Connick v. Myers:
Narrowing the Free Speech Right of Public Employees, 33 CATH. U. L. REv. 429,
453-54 (1984) [hereinafter Allred, Connick v. Myers] (arguing that the public
concern test made it more difficult for an employee to show that the First
Amendment protected his or her speech); Stephen Allred, From Connick to
Confusion: The Struggle to Define Speech on Matters of Public Concern, 64 IND.
L.J. 43, 50-75 (1988) (discussing the lower court's application of the Connick
standard).
48. Connick, 461 U.S. at 154.
49. Id. at 154. The Court emphasized, however, the fact-specific nature of
public employee speech claims and refused to establish any general standard.
Id.
50. Id. at 150.
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state's burden in justifying a particular discharge varies depend-
ing upon the nature of the employee's expression."
Five years after Connick implied a public concern threshold,
the Supreme Court conclusively established the threshold as a
prerequisite for First Amendment protection in Rankin v.
McPherson.52 The Court stated that the threshold for applying
the Pickering balancing test is whether the employee's "speech
may be 'fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of
public concern.'"" After deciding that the employee's statement
addressed a matter of public concern, the Court applied the
Pickering balancing test, burdening the public employer with
justifying the discharge on legitimate grounds.54 The Court
considered the effects of the statement on discipline, close working
relationships, the speaker's workplace performance, and the
51. Id. Stephen Allred argues Connick restricted Pickering by suggesting
the employee's speech must address a matter of public concern to receive First
Amendment protection and by allowing an employer to base its decision on a
"mere apprehension" the speech would disrupt the office. Allred, Connick v.
Myers, supra note 47, at 454 (arguing Connick may have been trying to reduce
the number of cases in which lower courts use Pickering's balancing test).
52. 483 U.S. 378 (1987). In Rankin, Ardith McPherson worked as a deputy
constable in the office of the Constable in Harris County, Texas. Id. at 380.
Ms. McPherson was not a peace officer, did not wear a uniform, and did not
make arrests or carry a gun. Id. Her duties were entirely clerical, and she
worked in an area that was not readily accessible to the public. Id. On March
30, 1981, Ms. McPherson heard on the radio that someone had attempted to
assassinate President Reagan. Id. at 381. After hearing the report, McPherson
and a co-worker talked about the incident and Ms. McPherson said,' "if they go
for him again, I hope they get him.'" Id. Another worker overheard the
statement and reported it to Constable Rankin, who immediately fired Ms.
McPherson. Id. at 381-82. Ms. McPherson filed suit, claiming her discharge
violated her free speech rights. Id. at 382.
53. Id. at 384 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983)). The
Court concluded Ms. McPherson's statement dealt with a matter of public
concern because she made the statement in a conversation addressing
presidential policies and following a bulletin on an assassination attempt. Id.
at 386. Although the Court recognized that a threat to kill the President would
not be protected by the First Amendment, it concluded Ms. McPherson's
statement did not amount to such a threat. Id. at 387. The Court further
stated the "inappropriate or controversial character of a statement is irrelevant
to the question whether it deals with a matter of public concern." Id. The
Court emphasized the importance of debate on issues that include "'vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials.'" Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964)).
54. Id. at 388.
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agency's public image.55
Finally, in Waters v. Churchill,56 the Supreme Court decided
whether the public concern test should be applied to what the
government employer thought the employee said, or to what the
trier of fact ultimately determines the employee said.57 Justice
O'Connor's plurality opinion cited previous Supreme Court
decisions that established procedural checks designed to deter
judicial and administrative agencies from chilling free speech."5
Although the plurality opinion implied that public employees' free
speech rights deserve such procedural protection,59 the Court
failed to provide a general standard." Instead, the plurality
decided to answer procedural questions on a case-by-case basis, "at
55. Id. at 388-89. The Court concluded the balancing test favored the
employee and her employer discharged her improperly because she made her
statement in a private office during a private conversation. Id. Moreover, the
statement did not demonstrate she was unfit to perform her duties. Id. at 389.
56. 114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994) (plurality opinion). Cheryl Churchill worked as
a nurse in a state hospital. Id. at 1882. Several nurses overheard a conver-
sation between Ms. Churchill and a co-worker, in which Ms. Churchill allegedly
criticized Ms. Waters, her supervisor, and the hospital's obstetrics department.
Id. The hospital fired Ms. Churchill based on information from a nurse who
overheard segments of the conversation. Id. at 1882-83. Ms. Churchill claimed
her words addressed concerns regarding the hospital's cross-training program,
hospital policies, and potential harmful effects on patient care. Id. at 1883.
Although she admitted criticizing the vice-president of nursing for policy
implementation, she claimed she actually defended Ms. Waters. Id. Other
nurses who overheard the conversation agreed with Ms. Churchill's summary.
Id. Ms. Churchill sued the hospital claiming that dismissal violated her free
speech rights. Id.
The district court granted the hospital's motion for summary judgment,
concluding the First Amendment did not protect the conversation because the
speech failed to address a matter of public concern. Id. at 1883-84. The
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding Ms.
Churchill's speech involved a matter of public concern and there was a material
issue of fact regarding the content of her speech. Id. at 1884. The appellate
court further stated the inquiry must turn on what the employee actually said,
not on what the employer thought the employee said. Id. The Supreme Court
held the public concern test applied to what the employer reasonably believed
the employee said, but a genuine issue of fact existed regarding the employer's
motivations. Id. at 1878.
57. Id. at 1882.
58. Id. at 1884-85 (citing cases demonstrating the Constitution mandates
certain procedural requirements in proceedings that may penalize protected
speech).
59. Id. at 1884.
60. Id. at 1885. As Justice O'Connor explained, the Court has never set
forth a general test to determine when the First Amendment requires a
procedural safeguard. Id.
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"61least until some workable general rule emerges.
The Waters plurality opinion concluded that the public
concern test should apply to what the employer reasonably
believed the employee said. The employer's decision to discharge
a public employee could be sustained if the employer used
reasonably reliable procedures to determine that the First
Amendment did not protect the employee's speech.62 In reaching
this conclusion, the Court recognized that it must treat public-
employee speech differently because of the State's interest in
efficiency and service.6 3 Indeed, the Court suggested that public
employees sacrifice some of their First Amendment protection
because they are paid to contribute to the government agency's
efficiency.64 The plurality opinion stated that any decision
requiring a public employer to determine which procedures ajury
would find reasonable imposes too heavy a burden on the em-
ployer.6 5 Instead, a standard requiring the care that a reasonable
manager would use before making an employment decision would
ensure good faith and fairness to the employee without unduly
burdening the employer.
66
61. Id. at 1886.
62. Id. at 1889.
63. Id. at 1888.
64. Id. at 1887-88. The plurality opinion stated the government as an
employer has a far greater interest in effectiveness and efficiency than the
government as a sovereign. Id. at 1888. The government cannot restrict public
speech to ensure efficiency, but it can restrict the speech of its employees if the
speech adversely affects the efficiency of government business. Id.
65. Id. The problem with the Court of Appeals' approach, according to the
Court, is "it would force the government employer to come to its factual
conclusions through procedures that substantially mirror the evidentiary rules
used in court. ... What works best in a judicial proceeding may not be
appropriate in the employment context." Id.
66. Id. at 1889. Waters explained the reasonableness standard with a few
examples. An employer who discharged an employee for alleged statements
with no evidence of those statements would be unreasonable. Id. It also would
most likely be unreasonable for an employer to act on extremely weak evidence,
such as unreliable hearsay, especially if the employer has an opportunity to
verify the facts. Id. The plurality opinion explained precedent did not preclude
a reasonableness test, because in previous cases the employer knew the true
content of the employee's speech. Id. (discussing Mt. Healthy, Pickering, and
Connick).
Applying the reasonableness test to the facts of Waters, the plurality
opinion held the employer reasonably believed the stories of Churchill's co-
workers based on the investigation conducted by the hospital. Id. at 1890.
Justice Scalia, however, argued the reasonableness test would confuse
employers and ultimately increase uncertainty because the opinion did not
define the test clearly. Id. at 1896-97 (Scalia, J., concurring). Further, he
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C. DEFAMATION LAW AND THE ACTUAL MALICE STANDARD
The Supreme Court constitutionalized defamation law6" in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,68 holding that a public officia 69
argued the proposed right to an investigation before dismissal for speech
expands First Amendment procedure and conflicts with Due Process cases that
hold public employees lacking a property interest in their jobs are not entitled
to a hearing before dismissal. Id. at 1894. In his dissent, Justice Stevens
criticized the plurality for eroding speech rights of public employees by allowing
discharges merely because the employer reasonably believed an employee's
speech was unprotected. Id. at 1898 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
67. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 2.01, at 2-4 (1994). "New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan is the starting point for all modem decisions
concerning the American law of defamation. The case revolutionized the law
of defamation by holding for the first time that the traditional tort rules
governing the law of libel were subject to the overriding constraints of the first
amendment." Id. § 2.01, at 2-4 (citations omitted). Previously, common law
defined defamation as that which "tends to ... diminish the esteem, respect,
goodwill or confidence in which the plaintiff is held, or to excite adverse,
derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against him." W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 773 (5th ed. 1984).
A full review of defamation law is beyond the scope of this Note. For
general background and analysis of defamation jurisprudence, see generally
Johnson, supra note 21, 21; Donald L. Magnetti, "In the End, Truth Will Out"
... Or Will It? "Merchant ofVenice,"Act II, Scene 2, 52 MO. L. REV. 299 (1987);
SMOLLA supra, § 3.15, at 3-40 to 3-41.
68. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In New York Times Co., the Commissioner of
Public Affairs of Montgomery, Alabama, sued the New York Times for the
publication of an article that described the misconduct of various officials during
civil rights demonstrations. Id. at 256. The Court found that although some
of the article's statements were inaccurate, the statements did not satisfy the
actual malice standard. Id. at 287-292.
The Court's opinion quoted extensively from precedent emphasizing the
importance of freedom of debate. Id. at 269-73. The Court explained the
Constitution safeguards the "unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes desired by the people." Id. at 269 (quoting
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). The Court stated "[ilt is a
prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with perfect
good taste, on all public institutions." Id. at 269 (quoting Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252,270 (1941)). The Court also stressed First Amendment protection
does not depend on the "'truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and
beliefs which are offered.'" Id. at 271 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
445 (1963)).
For a more extensive discussion of New York Times Co., see ROBERT H.
PHELPS & E. DOUGLAS HAMILTON, LIBEL: RIGHTS, RISKS, RESPONSIBILITIES 170-
73 (1978); SMOLLA, supra note 67, § 2.01, at 2-4 to 2-13.
69. The New York Times Co. decision applied only to public officials. 376
U.S. at 279-80. Rosenblatt v. Baer, defined a public official as any person who
holds a government position in which "the public has an independent interest
in the qualifications and performance of the person who holds it, beyond the
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cannot recover "damages for a defamatory falsehood ... unless he
proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is,
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not."0 The public official must prove
actual malice with "convincing clarity."'
The Supreme Court defined the standards for determining
when actual malice existed on a case-by-case basis. The Court
explained that only those statements "made with [a] high degree
of awareness of their probable falsity" are made with reckless
disregard. 2 It further stated that reckless disregard for the truth
exists when "the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to
the truth of his publication."73 As one commentator explained,
"[rieckless disregard is more than negligence, it is recklessness so
grave that it is tantamount to knowledge of falsity. It is more than
ignoring the truth, it is avoiding the truth."
7 4
Courts generally use a subjective test to determine whether
there was knowledge of falsity, focusing on what the defendant
general public interest in the qualifications and performance of all government
employees." 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966). Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts extended the
actual malice standard to public figures. 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967). Public
figures included people who commanded a substantial amount of public interest
by position alone or people who had thrust themselves into the maelstrom of an
important public controversy. Id. The complexities of the definitions of these
categories and the various tests applicable to each one is beyond the scope of
this Note. For further discussion, see PHELPS & HAMILTON, supra note 68, at
175-94; SMOLLA, supra note 67, §§ 2.01-2.30 at 2-1 to 2-104.
70. New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279-80. In contrast to public officials,
private figure plaintiffs must only establish fault to recover damages, which
requires, at a minimum, proof of negligence. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 347 (1974). For a comprehensive study of the actual malice standard,
see generally W. WAT HOPKINS, ACTUAL MALICE: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER
TIMES V. SULLIVAN (1989); SMOLLA, supra note 67, §§ 3.13-3.23, at 3-32.1 to
3.67.
71. New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 285-86. This standard "requires a
higher probability than proof by a mere preponderance of the evidence-it must
be strong, positive, and decisive-but it is still something less than the proof
beyond a reasonable doubt required in criminal cases." SMOLLA, supra note 67,
§ 3.07, at 3-21. The plaintiff also has the burden of proof on the issue of falsity.
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986).
72. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
73. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
74. PHELPS & HAMILTON, supra note 68, at 135. Actual malice is thus very
difficult to prove in most cases. A plaintiff nonetheless is entitled to broad
discovery on the issue, including deposition testimony regarding the defendant's
state of mind when he spoke or wrote the statement. Herbert v. Lando, 441
U.S. 153, 177 (1979).
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knew at the time of the speech.75 Nonetheless, courts permit the
introduction of objective evidence to prove or disprove the exis-
tence of actual malice, considering the conduct of the defendant
and what he should have known had he conducted a responsible
investigation.76 Once a public plaintiff proves with convincing
clarity that the defamation defendant acted with actual malice,77
the plaintiffcan recover actual damages, and, if state law permits,
presumed and punitive damages as well.7"
75. See Herbert, 441 U.S. at 170 (emphasizingNew York Times Co. requires
the plaintiff to focus on the defendant's subjective state of mind); see also
SMOLLA supra note 67, § 3.14, at 3-36 to 3-37 (discussing a subjective test).
76. See St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732 (emphasizing the importance of objective
evidence to expose a defendant's mental state); SMOLLA, supra note 67, § 3.14,
at 3-38 (discussing the use of objective evidence). See also Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union, 692 F.2d 189, 196 (1st Cir. 1982) (stating courts will infer
actual malice from objective facts), affd, 466 U.S. 485 (1984). Courts consider
the conduct of the investigation and the veracity of the sources used. HOPKINS,
supra note 70, at 144-45. When publishers establish that they investigated the
facts sufficiently, courts have found that there was no reckless disregard for the
truth. Id. at 145. "Reckless disregard for the truth can be established when a
court determines that an investigation conducted by a publisher is insufficient
to support the allegations published in the defamatory article." Id. at 150.
77. The Supreme Court eased the burden of proof for private individuals in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974), holding the burden of
proving actual malice does not apply to private plaintiffs. The Court nonethe-
less made recovery for damages more difficult. Prior to Gertz, courts presumed
damage resulted from libelous statements. Gertz held that although the States
may define the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher of a defamatory
falsehood injuring a private plaintiff, they "may not permit recovery of
presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on a showing
of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth." Id. at 349. Thus,
a private plaintiff "who establishes liability under a less demanding standard
than that stated by New York Times Co. may recover only such damages as are
sufficient to compensate him for actual injury." Id. at 350.
More recently, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders Inc. held a
private libel plaintiff need not demonstrate a libel defendant published a
defamatory statement with actual malice to recover punitive damages when the
statement addressed a matter of private rather than public concern. 472 U.S.
749, 761 (1985). Justice Brennan and others criticized the application of the
public concern test in the defamation context. See, e.g., id. at 789 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing the majority erred in relying on the Connick test because
"Connick explicitly limited its distinction between public and private concern to
the 'context' of a government employment situation") (citing Connick v. Myers,
461 U.S. 138, 148 n.8)); Magnetti, supra note 67, at 328 (stating Dun &
Bradstreet further complicated defamation law).
78. Actual damages are damages established by evidentiary proof but of a
nonpecuniary nature. SMOLLA, supra note 67, § 9.06(1), at 9-10. Presumed
damages are a form of compensatory damages that may be awarded without
any actual evidence of injury. Id. § 9.05(1), at 9-8. The jury may presume harm
occurred from the mere fact the defendant published the defamatory matter.
926
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D. THE CIRCUIT-COURT SPLIT: DOES THE FIRST AMENDMENT
PROTECT A PUBLIC EMPLOYEE'S RECKLESSLY FALSE
STATEMENTS?
The federal circuit courts are split over whether a public
employee's recklessly false statements are unprotected under the
First Amendment. 9 Pickering did not answer this question,80
yet its holding used language similar to theNew York Times actual
malice standard,8' which provides no protection to such state-
ments in the defamation context.8 2 Thus, the circuit courts have
not agreed on the level of protection that recklessly false state-
ments warrant,s" resulting in two conflicting approaches to the
debate.
The courts stating that a public employee's recklessly false
statements are unprotected rely primarily on the Pickering
holding that "absent proof of false statements knowingly or
recklessly made by him, a teacher's exercise of his right to speak"
on a matter of public concern cannot serve as a basis for dis-
missal.8 4 These courts conclude that the Court refused to extend
First Amendment privileges to recklessly false statements.85
Id. Presumed damages are permissible in any case in which actual malice is
established. Id. at 9-9. Punitive damages are constitutionally permitted in any
case in which actual malice is proven. Id. § 9.08(2), at 9-16.2 to 9-17. See
generally SMOLLA, supra note 67, §§ 9.01-9.14, at 9-4 to 9-79 (discussing
damages in defamation actions).
79. See supra notes 4-6 (describing the various circuit courts' positions
regarding First Amendment protection for employees' recklessly false
statements).
80. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 n.6 (1968); see also supra
notes 14-30 and accompanying text (discussing Pickering and its holding).
81. Compare Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574-75 (holding that without proof the
teacher made the false statements knowingly or recklessly, the teacher's
exercise of free speech right cannot be a basis for dismissal) with New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (holding a public official
cannot recover damages unless he proves the statement was made "With
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false
or not").
82. New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279-80.
83. See Johnson v. Multnomah County, 48 F.3d 420, 423 (9th Cir.)
(discussing circuit court split), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2616 (1995).
84. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574.
85. See, e.g., Williams v. Commonwealth, 24 F.3d 1526,1535 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 358 (1994). Although some decisions in these circuits have
recognized the Pickering Court's qualification of its holding, see, e.g., Brewer v.
Hart, 909 F.2d 1035, 1037 n.2 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574
n.6, as support that recklessly false statements "might" lose their First
Amendment protection), most simply ignore it and do not recognize the circuit
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Some of these courts argue that the Pickering decision applied the
New York Times actual malice standard.86 Often, these courts
analogize a public employee's recklessly false statements to speech
deemed unworthy of First Amendment protection, such as
profanity, offensive language, and defamatory remarks." In
sum, however, these courts' discussions of the topic are limited and
underdeveloped. 8
In contrast, courts holding that a public employee's recklessly
false statements are protected recognize the qualification of the
Pickering holding contained in Pickering's footnote six.9 In
footnote six, the Supreme Court declined to decide what protection
to provide recklessly false statements 0 Courts assert this
qualification allows the recklessly false statements of a public
employee to receive First Amendment protection, and thus courts
should consider the recklessness of the statement as one of the
factors in the Pickering balancing test.91 Recognizing that an
allowance for erroneous statements is important to the freedom of
debate,92 these courts usually consider the recklessness of the
statements as a factor weighing against the employee,93 but
split on the issue. See generally supra notes 4-6 (discussing the circuit split).
86. E.g., Honeymoon v. Brewer, 528 F.2d 750, 755 (7th Cir. 1976); see also
supra notes 21,21-22 (describing commentators' positions on whether Pickering
used the New York Times standard).
87. See, e.g., Brenner v. Brown, 36 F.3d 18, 20 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing cases
that refused to extend First Amendment protection to such language).
88. See, e.g., Powell v. Gallentine, 992 F.2d 1088, 1091 (10th Cir. 1993)
(stating that falsity is irrelevant unless knowing or reckless but not discussing
recklessness).
89. See, e.g., Johnson v. Multnomah County, 48 F.3d 420, 423 (9th Cir.)
(citing Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 n.6 (1968)), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 2616 (1995); Brasslett v. Cota, 761 F.2d 827, 840 (1st Cir. 1985)
(citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574 n.6).
90. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574 n.6.
91. See, e.g., Brasslett, 761 F.2d at 840-41 (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574
n.6, and finding that the malicious nature of the statements is a factor in
balancing interests).
92. See, e.g., Johnson, 48 F.3d at 424 (quoting New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964) for the proposition that "erroneous
statement is inevitable in free debate").
93. See American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 830
F.2d 294, 306 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating no court has summarily denied a public
employee's First Amendment claim in absence of clear showing of harm
resulting from such speech, yet concluding "intentional falsehoods are among
the forms of expression least deserving of first amendment protection, and a
public employee's interest in uttering deliberate, harmful lies obviously cannot
outweigh the [employer's] interest in promoting the more deserving first
amendment activities" of its business).
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refuse to consider it as dispositive. 4
For example, the Ninth Circuit recently held that a public
employee's claim for reinstatement should not be rejected simply
because the employee's statements were recklessly false.95 Citing
the Pickering qualification96 and explaining that protection of
false statements ensures the survival of freedom of expression,97
the Ninth Circuit concluded that it should consider the reckless-
ness of the statement "in light of the public employer's showing of
actual injury to its legitimate interests, as part of the Pickering
balancing test."98 Similarly, the First Circuit concluded that a
fire chief's criticisms of the fire department did not justify his dis-
charge even if they were recklessly false.99 In so holding, the
court explained that, although a recklessly false statement may
"create a pre-sumption that the employee's interest in uttering it
is subordinate to the government's interest in suppressing it, the
[Supreme] Court has preserved the possibility that such a
statement might be protected if it resulted in no actual harm to the
employer.""° The First Circuit decided, therefore, that reckless-
ness is only a factor in the balancing test.''
II. THE NEW YORK TIMES STANDARD FAILS TO
PROVIDE A PUBLIC EMPLOYEE'S RECKLESSLY FALSE
STATEMENTS WITH ADEQUATE FIRST AMENDMENT
PROTECTION
When analyzing a public employee's recklessly false state-
ments, courts shoulduse a test that balances each party's interests
on a case-by-case basis.' An appropriate balancing approach
would result in a fair and thorough investigation of the employee's
and the employer's interests and would recognize the individual
right to and social need for free speech among public employees.
94. See Johnson, 48 F.3d at 424 (stating false statements "should be
considered in light of the public employer's showing of actual injury to its
legitimate interests").
95. Id.
96. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 n.6 (1968).
97. Johnson, 48 F.3d at 424.
98. Id.
99. Brasslett v. Cota, 761 F.2d 827, 840-41 (1st Cir. 1985).
100. Id. (citing Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 n.6 (1968)).
101. Id. at 841.
102. Johnson, 48 F.3d at 424 (stating the recklessly false statements of a
public employee are not per se unprotected and concluding recklessness should
be considered in light of public employer's showing of actual injury to its
legitimate interests, as part of Pickering balancing test).
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Such balancing would reject the New York Times standard which
assumes that a public employee's recklessly false speech is
unprotected. Nonetheless, the lower courts often presume an
employee's recklessly false speech is not protected. 3 or apply the
New York Times standard and deny such statements any First
Amendment protection.'14 These broad assumptions oversimpli-
fy the courts' analyses and inhibit a thorough investigation of the
differences between speech in the public employment context and
speech in the defamation context.10 5 A careful investigation
reveals the inadequacy of applying the New York Times actual
malice standard in the public employment context and the
superiority of a case-by-case, balance-oriented approach.
Critical distinctions between public employment speech and
defamation become apparent when lower courts apply the New
York Times standardto apublic employee's recklesslyfalse speech.
The lower courts' failure to address the procedural and substantive
distinctions between the public employment and defamation
contexts disrupts the fragile scales of the balancing test, thereby
threatening the constitutional protection of a public employee's
recklessly false statements. Because the New York Times
standard fails to require proof of actual harm,'0 6 it ignores the
careful and thorough balancing that is critical to a fair determi-
nation of rights in the public employment context and, in so doing,
decreases the public employee's free speech rights. Furthermore,
application of the New York Times standard improperly equates
the different interests involved in the public employment and
defamation contexts, resulting in public employee self-censorship.
Finally, the remedies of the New York Times standard inappropri-
ately imply a high level of protection for the public employer and
thus inadequately reflect the competing values involved.
103. See supra notes 4-6 (discussing the circuit court split) and notes 84-88
and accompanying text (discussing the rationale of courts that find statements
unprotected).
104. See generally supra notes 4-6, 21, 21, and 84-88 and accompanying text
(discussing the circuit court split and circuit courts' application of the New York
Times standard).
105. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of
analysis in circuit courts).
106. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (explaining presumed
damages are allowed and no proof of harm is required in any case in which
actual malice is established or in cases involving a private figure plaintiff and
no matter of public concern).
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A. THE NEW YORK TIMES STANDARD FAILS TO BALANCE
ADEQUATELY THE HARM CAUSED BY THE PUBLIC-
EMPLOYEE'S RECKLESSLY FALSE STATEMENTS
Because many recklessly false statements are harmless, a
public employer should have to prove actual harm to justify an
employment decision based on the recklessly false statements of
a public employee. Courts should consider the degree of harm in
determining the level of protection that the statement warrants.
The New York Times standard, however, does not require proof of
actual harm.' 7 In so doing, it treats, for constitutional purposes,
harmless and harmful speech equally, thus ignoring the basic
case-by-case balancing required by a fair and thorough analy-
sis' and in turn decreasing the free speech rights of public
employees." 9
Many recklessly false statements in the public employment
context are harmless. In American Postal Workers Union v.
United States Postal Service,"0 for example, a mail carrier wrote
an editorial to his union's newspaper describing how he had
illegally opened and read a Congressman's letter supporting a
restriction on labor unions."' The mail carrier wrote the editori-
al as fiction, hoping that it would arouse support for unionism."2
After the editorial's publication, the Postal Service fired the mail
carrier."' The Postal Service could not prove, however, that the
editorial caused any harm: the Service's functions were not
impaired, workplace harmony was not disrupted, and the office's
107. If a defamation plaintiff merely proves a statement is false, the
statement is still protected by the First Amendment and the plaintiffs claim
fails. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). If, on the
other hand, the plaintiff proves the statement was made with knowledge of its
falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth, the statement does not receive
any First Amendment protection and, if state law permits presumed damages,
the plaintiffs claim succeeds, regardless of the amount of harm the statement
caused. Id; see also supra notes 77-78 (explaining when proof of actual harm
is required).
108. If a court requires an employer to only prove the employee's statements
are recklessly false, without any proof of harm, the court does not balance the
degree of harm caused against the employer's interests. See supra notes 21, 21-
23 and accompanying text (discussing the importance ofbalancing in Pickering).
109. Given this presumption of harm, the court ignores the possibility that
recklessly false speech can be harmless.
110. 830 F.2d 294 (D.C. Cir 1987).
111. Id. at 297.
112. Id. at 298.
113. Id. at 298-99.
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integrity was not discredited." 4 Furthermore, the mail carrier
duly apologized for writing the editorial and demonstrated no
characteristics that would make him unworthy as a public
servant."5 Although the mail carrier's speech was recklessly
false, the Postal Service had no valid reason for firing him."6
Situations such as the postal worker's indicate that harmless,
recklessly false speech should be treated differently from harmful,
recklessly false speech. A test that balances each party's interest
on a case-by-case basis provides for such a distinction. Due to the
variety of factual situations that arise in the public employment
context, a court should employ a test to function as a flexible scale
for weighing the interests of the public employer against the
interests of the public employee."' A balancing test, instead of
providing a general standard that dictates formulaic solutions,
requires courts to consider all of the circumstances as factors;
indeed, no individual factor is dispositive."8
This balancing concept requires the employer to show some
measure of actual harm to weigh against the employee's free
speech interest."9 In Connick, for example, the Court held that
114. Id. at 303-06.
115. Id. at 298.
116. Id. The Carter hypothetical illustrates another situation in which a
public employer has no reason to punish an employee's privately expressed
statements that do not affect working relationships or office efficiency. Supra
text accompanying note 1; see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 279 n.19 ("Even a false statement may be deemed to make a valuable
contribution to public debate, since it brings about 'the clearer perception and
livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.'") (quoting
JOHN S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 15 (1947)); supra note 68 (discussing value of false
or controversial speech to freedom of debate).
117. See supra notes 21, 21-23 and accompanying text (discussing Pickering
balancing test).
118. Compare supra notes 21, 21-23 and accompanying text (discussing
Pickering balancing test and its application to a variety of factual situations)
with Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974) (stating that the
Court must lay down a rule of application because "an ad hoc resolution of the
competing interests at stake in each particular [defamation] case is not
feasible"). As one court explained, a "whistle blower" will undoubtably cause
disruption in the work environment, but the First Amendment balancing test
weighs the disruption against the employee's rights of free speech. O'onnell
v. Yanchulis, 875 F.2d 1059, 1062 (3rd Cir. 1989).
119. See, e.g., Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1887 (1994) (plurality
opinion) (stating in many situations, government will have to "make a
substantial showing that the speech is, in fact, likely to be disruptive before it
may be punished"); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987) (stating the
state bears the burden ofjustifying employee's discharge on legitimate grounds);
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983) (requiring employers to show they
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when a public employee's speech addressed matters of public
concern in a very limited sense, the employer only had to prove
that it reasonably believed the speech would cause harm. 20 In
contrast, Rankin held the public employer had the burden of
proving that the speech disrupted the agency's legitimate inter-
ests.'2 ' Waters concluded that an employer must conduct a
reasonable investigation into what an employee actually said
before making any adverse employment decisions. 2 A balanc-
ing test reconciles these varied holdings because it allows courts
to increase or decrease the employer's burden ofjustificationbased
on other factors, such as the public importance of the employee's
speech." This flexibility is desirable because it enables courts
to protect harmless, recklessly false speech that would otherwise
be punished under a per se approach. By protecting such speech,
this approach recognizes the employee's right to freedom of
expression and the public's need to obtain information on public
agencies.
The New York Times standard ignores the difference between
harmful and harmless recklessly false speech and thus abandons
the case-by-case balancing that should serve as the foundation for
determining the protection such statements will receive. 24
Because it does not have a balancing framework, the New York
Times standard decreases the free speech rights of public em-
ployees. Under the standard, if the employer proves the state-
ments were recklessly false, no balancing of interests occurs.'
25
This decreases the range of speech that is available to public
employees because they never have the opportunity to prove other
factors weighing in their favor, specifically, that the speech
harmed no one. If, for example, a deputy working in a county
police station jokingly states that a sheriff has accepted money to
disregard parking tickets, she should be able to show that she
at least reasonably believed the employees' speech would cause harm).
120. Connick, 461 U.S. at 154.
121. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388.
122. Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1890.
123. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 154 (stating the limited First Amendment
interest of employee's speech permits employer to take action when it
reasonably believed speech would cause disruption, yet emphasizing this does
not apply to all factual situations).
124. See supra notes 107-109 and accompanying text (discussing the
inadequacies of the New York Times standard).
125. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)
(setting forth an actual malice standard); see also supra notes 107-109
(discussing the actual malice standard's preemption of Pickering's balancing).
1996]
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made the comment in a private office to just one other colleague
and that the comment did not affect the office's efficiency or
integrity."6 Otherwise, the employer can legally fire her
because her statement was recklessly false, regardless of the fact
that it did not cause harm. The New York Times standard gives
the public employer the ability to restrict the employee's expres-
sion without any valid justification.
The Court's traditional deference to the decisions of the
government as a public employer does not justify giving the
employer this advantage.'27 Indeed, the Court has never pre-
sumed that a public employee's speech caused harm; the employer
must always show some actual detriment." For example, a
school that fires a teacher for accusing her supervisor of misman-
agement and criminal conduct should be required to show that the
teacher's statements destroyed office harmony or disrupted
working relationships.'29 The courts applying the New York
Times standard to public employment situations fail to recognize
that they effectively decrease the free speech rights of public
employees because they eliminate the weighing process complete-
ly.130
126. Cf Rankin, 483 U.S. at 378 (granting First Amendment protection to
a constable's statement made in a private office).
127. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's
traditional deference to the State as public employer).
128. "[Tlhe Government bears the burden of justifyling its adverse employ-
ment action." United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct.
1003, 1013 (1995) (citing Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1887 (1994)
(plurality opinion); Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388).
In Connick v. Myers, the Supreme Court held the public employer could
decide to dismiss an employee if the employer reasonably believed the
employee's speech would disrupt workplace efficiency and relationships. 461
U.S. 138, 154 (1983). In so holding, however, the Court still used the Pickering
balancing test to weigh the statement's limited relationship to the topic of
public concern against the employer's fear of disruption. Id. The Court did not
assume there was harm, nor did it purport to dictate a test for future cases. Id.
129. Cf Johnson v. Multnomah County, 48 F.3d 420 (9th Cir.) (granting
First Amendment protection to a teacher who accused his supervisor of
mismanagement and criminal conduct), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2616 (1995).
130. See, e.g., Moore v. City of Kilgore, 877 F.2d 364, 376 (5th Cir.) (per
curiam) (applying the New York Times standard to statements a public
employee made to the press and not balancing interests or harm), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1003 (1989); Neubauer v. City of McAlen, 766 F.2d 1567, 1579-80 (5th
Cir. 1985) (applying the New York Times standard to factually incorrect
statements a public official made to a grand jury and not balancing interests or
harm).
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B. THE NEW YORK TIMES STANDARD IMPROPERLY EQUATES THE
INTERESTS OF THE DEFAMATION DEFENDANT WITH THOSE OF
THE PUBLIC-EMPLOYEE PLAINTIFF
A second problem with applying theNew York Times standard
to a public employee's recklessly false statements is that, in so
doing, the courts equate the interests of the defamation defendant
with those of the public-employee plaintiff, and the interests of the
defamation plaintiff with those of the public-employer defen-
dant. 3' These interests are not parallel. 132  The New York
Times standard involves competing individual interests. Adopting
it in a context that involves competing individual, governmental,
and public interests 3 ignores the public's interest in a public
employee's speech and in turn, potentially encourages public
employees to censor themselves.
Both parties in defamation cases, whether individuals or
organizations, represent primarily individual interests.3 4 The
defamation plaintiff sues to clear his reputation, name, and
dignity.3 5 The defamation defendant defends her individual
131. The defamation defendant and the public-employee plaintiff are the
speakers. The defamation plaintiff and the public-employer defendant are both
the objects of the speech.
132. "The Supreme Court has consistently noted that dismissal from
employment and libel actions trigger different sorts of First Amendment
analysis." Barnes v. Small, 840 F.2d 972, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing Connick
v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1984); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,
574 (1968)).
133. As one commentator explains, the State in the public employment
context has an interest in maintaining employee efficiency and discipline, "a
factor essential for the government 'to perform its responsibilities effectively
and economically.'" Patricia A. Thompson-Hill, Note, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.,
v. Greenmoss Builders: "Matters ofPrivate Concern" Give Civil Libel Defendants
Lowered First Amendment Protection, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 883, 919 (1986)
(quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in
part)). A court weighs these interests against the public employee's individual
interest in free speech. Id. In defamation cases, however, both parties have
personal interests, rather than governmental or organizational ones. Id. The
plaintiffs interests lie in his or her good name, while the defendant's interests
are those of freedom of expression. 'Thus, the concerns in government
employment and in defamation cases diverge widely." Id.
134. See LAURENCE H. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 2, at 2-4, and
§ 4, at 8-13 (1978) (stating a defamation action protects an individual's interest
in reputation); supra notes 131-133 and accompanying text (discussing the
interests of parties in defamation suits).
135. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) ("The right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from
unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our basic concept
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right to speak freely.'36 Although the defendant also represents
the public's interest in having access to information,'37 this
interest is secondary to the defendant's personal free speech
interests.' Thus, despite often involving individuals and
organizations," 9 defamation cases represent a competition
between individual interests.'
In public employment cases, however, the plaintiff is always
an individual employee and the defendant is always a public
employer.'' The plaintiff sues to protect his individual right to
speak freely on matters of public concern and to get his job
back."'42 Additionally, the public-employee plaintiff represents
the public's interest in remaining informed about the government
agency involved and ensuring the agency's continued efficiency,
reliability, and accountability. 4 3  The public-employer
defendant's interests, on the other hand, include the government
agency's interests in efficiency, reputation, workplace harmony,
of the essential dignity and worth of every human being-a concept at the root
of any decent system of ordered liberty.").
136. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-80 (1964)
(discussing the importance of free speech in defamation context).
137. SeeNew York Times Co., 376U.S. at269(explainingtheFirstAmendment
protects freedom of expression on public questions to ensure "'political and social
changes desired by the people'") (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
484 (1957)).
138. Cf Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 149-50 (1967).
Emphasizing the personal nature of the guarantee of free speech, the Court
stated: "History shows us that the Founders were not always convinced that
unlimited discussion of public issues would be 'for the benefit of all of us,'" id.
(quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967)), "but that they firmly
adhered to the proposition that the 'true liberty of the press' permitted 'every
man to publish his opinion.'" Id. (quoting Respublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. 319, 325
(1788)).
139. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (involving an
attorney suing a magazine); New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 254 (involving the
Commissioner of Public Affairs suing the New York Times); see also supra notes
131-133 (discussing parties involved in defamation suits).
140. Thompson-Hill, Note, supra note 133, at 919.
141. See, e.g., Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994) (plurality opinion)
(involving a nurse suing hospital officials); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378
(1987) (involving a clerical employee suing the constable and county); Moore v.
City of Kilgore, 877 F.2d 364 (5th Cir.) (involving a fire fighter suing a
municipality), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1003 (1989).
142. See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)
(involving a school teacher seeking reinstatement after dismissal).
143. Id. at 571-72 (discussing the importance of informed decision-making
by electorate and the public interest in having free and unhindered debate).
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and the maintenance of management control and public trust.'"
The defendant also represents the public's interest in maintaining
an efficient government. 4 ' Thus, public employment cases
represent the conflicting interests of an individual, a governmental
entity, and the public.
Because defamation and public employment cases concern two
distinct sets of competing interests, application of the New York
7imes standard is unsound in the public employment context. The
New York imes standard provides the defamation defendant with
a large degree of protection to further his individual interest in
expressing his opinion. 4 Once the plaintiff proves the speech
is recklesslyfalse, however, this protection disappears because the
private individual has a limited constitutional interest in false
speech. 4 7 Because the public's right to know what a private
individual thinks about a public official is secondary to this limited
individual interest,' there is no reason to extend further pro-
tection to the defamation defendant's recklessly false statements.
Public employees' recklessly false statements, on the other
hand, deserve greater protection because, unlike defamation
defendants, public employees represent more than just their
individual interests.'49 The public has a strong interest in
knowing about the activities of public agencies and guaranteeing
their efficiency and reliability.5 ' Indeed, because the public
relies on public agencies, the public's right to know what public
employees know about their agencies outweighs the public's right
to know what private individuals think about public officials.
Public employees serve this public interest because they are an
144. See Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388-89; Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569-70; see also
supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing the various interests involved
in a public employment context).
145. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (noting importance of efficiency of public
services); see also supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing the various
interests involved in a public employment context).
146. See generally New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
(explaining the importance of free speech and establishing a high burden of
actual malice to protect speech). Compare supra notes 71-74 (discussing the
heavy burden of actual malice standard) with supra note 138 (discussing the
importance of individual interest in defamation context).
147. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964).
148. See supra note 138 and accompanying text (discussing the importance
of individual free speech right in defamation context).
149. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing the various
interests involved in a public employment context).




important, and often the only, information source regarding public
agencies. 5'
A court applying the New York Times standard improperly
equates the defamation defendant's predominantly individual free
speech interests with the public employee's more expansive free
speech interests as a public representative and a vital information
source about government agencies. By adopting the New York
Times standard in the public employment context, therefore,
courts do not grant public employees' recklessly false speech the
protection it merits. Although an employee's recklessly false
statements may not be useful in and of themselves to the public,
punishing the employee regardless of the harm caused would deter
the employee from making future statements that could be
reliable. If a public employee knows a court will punish him,
regardless of harm, for recklessly false statements, he will likely
censor his own speech and refrain from speaking out about an
agency's suspicious or illegal activities.'52 The application of the
New York Times standard may not harm the employee's limited
individual interests, 153 but it decreases the scope of the
employee's speech and thus diminishes the likelihood that the
public will discover an agency's undesired activities.
C. THE REMEDIES OF THE NEW YoRK TIMES STANDARD
INADEQUATELY REFLECT THE COMPETING VALUES OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE AND THE PUBLIC EMPLOYER
Defamation cases and public employment cases involve
different remedies.5 These differing remedies imply that courts
151. Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1887 (1994) (plurality opinion)
(stating "[glovernment employees are often in the best position to know what
ails the agencies for which they work").
152. For example, consider the importance of free speech for police officers.
A suppression of information does not serve the public's interest in maintaining
a reliable and law-abiding police department. Courts thus should not punish
a deputy's false statement that a sheriff is accepting bribes to disregard parking
tickets so that, when the deputy learns about the sheriffs actual involvement
in narcotics, she will be willing to speak and expose his activity to the public.
153. A public employee's interests are limited when his speech is recklessly
false. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (stating knowingly false
statements do not enjoy constitutional protection). The employee's interests are
limited further because he has partially waived his free speech rights in
exchange for a government job. See Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1885 (explaining a
public employer can prohibit its employees from using offensive speech with the
public or with co-workers).
154. Compare Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-48 (1974)
(stating a plaintiff may recover special, compensatory, and punitive damages for
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distinguish the interests involved in one context from the interests
involved in the other context.'55 Indeed, the remedies reflect the
speech's value in each context. Accordingly, by applying the New
York Times standardto apublic employee's recklesslyfalse speech,
courts fail to understand the underlying values of the speech in
each context. In so doing, the courts disregard the balancing of
interests appropriate and necessary in the public employment
context.
The appropriate remedy in a defamation suit includes actual,
presumed, and punitive damages.' This compensation scheme
reflects the courts' understanding of the interests involved, the
most important of which is the defendant's free speech right.'57
The actual malice standard protects that right by establishing a
high burden of proof for the plaintiff.5 The Court nonetheless
recognizes the need to punish and deter defamatory remarks.'59
Accordingly, the defamation plaintiff is entitled to punitive
damages, which can devastate the defendant. Punitive damages
give the jury an opportunityto punish the defendant for his speech
and provide deterrence for similar future speech."' A large
award can destroy current business activities and cripple any
potential business ventures.'' This compensation scheme thus
defamation) with Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 382 (1987) (stating a
plaintiff "sought reinstatement, backpay, costs and fees, and other equitable
relief" for violation of the right of free speech).
155. See, e.g., American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv.,
830 F.2d 294, 308 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating defamation cases involve civil
liability for damage to a person's reputation and Pickering cases involve
disciplining public employees in response to speech that allegedly harms
government).
156. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (discussing damages in
defamation actions).
157. See supra note 138 and accompanying text (discussing importance of
individual free speech right in a defamation context).
158. See supra note 71 (discussing the heavy burden of actual malice
standard).
159. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)
(establishing the actual malice standard punishes statements made with
knowledge of falsity or with reckless disregard for truth).
160. See generally supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (discussing
defamation damages).
161. See, e.g., New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 277-78 (stating judgment
awarded in trial court was 1,000 times greater than the maximum fine provided
by state criminal statute and questioning whether, because there is no double-
jeopardy limitation on civil lawsuits, a newspaper can survive a succession of
such judgments); see also Thompson-Hill, Note, supra note 133, at 885 n.8
(stating that increase in defamation litigation has led to increase in insurance
costs).
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serves to protect free speech yet, once the plaintiff proves actual
malice, severely punishes the defendant thereby deterring
defamatory remarks.
In the public employment context, however, the courts
consider the interests involved to be far more balanced. 62
Neither party has an interest that heavily outweighs an interest
ofthe other. Courts, therefore, often award a public employee with
reinstatement and backpay.163 Reinstating the public employee
simply returns the employee to his pre-speech status. Moreover,
it does not sharply discipline the public employer and does not
deter it from making future employment decisions. Neither party,
therefore, gains or loses much in this context. This more balanced
approach, void of severe penalties for the employer, reflects the
Court's traditional deference to a public employer's employment
decisions.' 64 Further, this approach does not restrict the deci-
sion-making power necessary for agency efficiency and does not
burden the public-employee plaintiff with a high burden of proof.
Courts should not apply the actual malice standard in the public
employment context because it gives the employer too much
protection and places too great a burden of proof on the public
employee. In doing so, it fails to recognize that the values in the
two contexts are distinct and, to be fair, should be treated as such.
III. A PROPOSED STANDARD:
CONSIDERING RECKLESSNESS AS A FACTOR IN
THE PICKERING BALANCING TEST
Rather than apply the New York Times standard to a public
employee's recklessly false statements, courts should maintain an
exclusive focus on a case-by-case balancing test. Pickering and its
progeny set forth such an approach.'65 Applying the Pickering
balancing test, and considering the recklessness of the employee's
false statements as a factor in that test, preserves the emphasis on
the balancing of interests deemed essential to the public employ-
ment context 166 and furthers freedom of debate by maintaining
162. See supra notes 21,21-23 and accompanying text (discussingPickering's
balancing test).
163. E.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 382 (1987).
164. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's
traditional deference to the State as public employer).
165. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
166. See supra notes 21, 21-23 and accompanying text (discussing the
importance of Pickering balancing test)
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the constitutional protection ofa public employee's recklessly false
statements. 67
In the Carter hypothetical,"~ if the court applied the New
York Times standard to Ms. Carter's statements, as the Sixth,
Seventh, and Eighth Circuits' precedents require,"' it would
hold that Ms. Carter's claim failed because her statements were
recklessly false and thus unprotected. 170 The court would deny
Ms. Carter her job and her free speech rights because it would
never reach the Pickering balancing test or the question of
harm.'' Furthermore, the decision would chill public-employee
speech and thus restrict the public's ability to obtain information
on public agencies. 72 Thus, if the speech is recklessly false and
causes no harm, this standard produces an unsatisfactory result.
Under aPickering approach, in contrast, after first determin-
ing the extent to which the speech addressed a matter of public
concern, 173 courts would balance the employee's free speech
interest against the employer's interest in efficiency and
workplace harmony. 74 Within this balancing process, the courts
would consider the harm caused by the recklessly false state-
ments. 75 If the statements did not cause any harm, the employ-
er could not rely on that factor to weigh in its favor on the
Pickering scales.'76 Instead, the employer would have to prove
167. See supra notes 107-109 and accompanying text (discussing the New
York Times standard's preemption of Pickering's balancing).
168. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (presenting Carter hypotheti-
cal).
169. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text (discussing circuit split).
170. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)
(stating statements made with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless
disregard for truth are unprotected).
171. See supra notes 107-109 (discussing New York Times standard and its
failure to require proof of actual harm); supra notes 127-130 and accompanying
text (discussing New York Times preemption of balancing test).
172. See supra notes 146-153 and accompanying text (discussing the effects
of equating interests in defamation and public employment contexts).
173. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987) (establishing the
threshold public concern test).
174. See, e.g., Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388 (balancing interests after concluding
that speech addressed matter of public concern); Johnson v. Multnomah County,
48 F.3d 420, 423-24 (9th Cir.) (concluding a court should consider recklessness
of an employee's statement as part of Pickering balancing test), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 2616 (1995).
175. See Johnson, 48 F.3d at 424 (advocating "an approach that considers
the actual damage done to the government by the reckless statement").
176. See supra notes 21,21-23 and accompanying text (discussing Pickering's
balancing test).
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that it would have made the employment decision regardless of the
speech.'77
If the hypothetical Carter court took this approach, for
example, it might determine that Ms. Carter's speech deserved
First Amendment protection because it was harmless. Because
she addressedher concerns privately, the school board's reputation
and image remained untainted. Furthermore, assuming Ms.
Carter's relationship with Ms. Larkin did not suffer, the court
could also find that workplace harmony and discipline remained
intact, especially if only a few other teachers knew about her
statements and they did not resent her or the school board because
of the incident.
On the other hand, if the school in Carter alleged and proved
harm, this approach does not preclude a finding that the speech is
unprotected. Indeed, thePickering test considers harm as a factor
weighing against the employee. 8  Thus, if the statements
caused moderate, but not extreme harm, a court should weigh that
harm against the employee. The employer could rely on the harm
to weigh in its favor, but would still have to prove that its interests
substantially outweigh those of the employee. 7 9
Finally, if the school proved that Ms. Carter's speech caused
severe harm, the court should weigh that harm heavily against
her. The school would then only have a slight burden of proof,
showing that it reasonably believed that its actions were appropri-
ate. 8° This sliding scale approach forces courts to use a more
flexible and adaptable analysis in the public employment con-
text-a flexibility intended in Pickering."8' Although this per-
177. Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977); see also
supra notes 37-33, 38 and accompanying text (discussing Mt. Healthy causation
test).
178. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1967) (discussing
the school's argument that the teacher's speech harmfed the school's operation).
179. Cf Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987) (requiring a public
employer to justify discharge on legitimate grounds when speech addressed
matter of public concern).
180. Cf Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983) (requiring a public
employer to show only that he reasonably believed the statement would cause
harm when the statement addressed matters of public concern in limited sense).
181. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569 (discussing the need for a flexible test that
applies to variety of fact situations); see also supra notes 21, 21-23 and
accompanying text (discussing the application of Pickering's balancing test to
a variety of factual situations).
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haps creates more work for the courts," 2 it is more faithful to the
Pickering frameworkbecause it refrains from prematurely tipping
the scales in favor of either party.
CONCLUSION
Courts should determine the First Amendment protection that
a public employee's recklessly false statements warrant by
employing a test based on a case-by-case balancing of interests.
Such a test distinguishes between harmful and harmless speech,
thoroughly investigates each party's interests, and determines a
fair equilibrium of rights between the parties. The New York
Times standard does not adequately address these issues. Indeed,
it does not require proof of actual harm, incorrectly equates the
interests involved in each context, and its compensation scheme
incorrectly reflects the respective values involved. Courts should
not, therefore, apply the New York Times standard to find that a
public employee's recklessly false statements are unprotected by
the First Amendment.
Instead, courts should consider the recklessness of a public
employee's false statements as a factor that weighs against the
employee in a Pickering balancing test. This approach is faithful
to a standard with a balancing foundation but does not decrease
the free speech rights of the public employee. Furthermore, it
requires courts to examine the respective interests involved and
reinforces the Supreme Court's recognition that the defamation
and public employment contexts are distinct and require separate
standards. APickering analysis affords the courts an opportunity
to shape the rights of public employees and employers as each
factual situation requires. It permits a court to circumscribe
public employee speech when the public employer has a sufficient
countervailing interest, and to expand public employee speech
opportunities when the public employer is unharmed. Indeed, it
precludes courts from dismissing free speech cases simply because
the speech is reckless, and forces them to confront the more
difficult choices that arise when balancing the speech's reckless-
ness with the harm it did or did not cause. In so doing, courts can
ensure that the rights of public employees are not arbitrarily
182. Some may contend this proposal is too unpredictable. Nonetheless, "we
should not abdicate [our role of examining difficult problems] by formulation of
per se rules with no justification other than the enhancement of predictability
and the reduction ofjudicial investigation." United States v. Topco Assocs., 405
U.S. 598, 622 (1972) (Burger, J., dissenting).
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decreased while retaining the flexibility essential to the survival
of the Pickering doctrine.
